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Abstract 
The recently announced Independent Innovation Strategy (IIS) signifies the climax of 
China’s technology catch-up effort during the past 30 years. This paper investigates 
the efficacy of, and prospects for this effort by reviewing comments from the relevant 
literature, by conducting a theoretical analysis based on industrial economics and by 
testing hypotheses with the latest empirical evidence. Our results suggest a bleak 
prospect for IIS if the Chinese government retains its excessive administrative 
protection of state-owned enterprises, and a long struggle ahead for China to finally 
push further into the technology frontier.   
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The Master said:  
“At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. 
At thirty, I stood firm. 
At forty, I had no doubts. 
At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven. 
…” 
Confucius, The Confucian Analects, 500 BC  
1. Introduction 
The year 2008 witnesses the 30th anniversary of China’s reform and open-door 
policy, which at first dragged the country back from the brink of economic collapse, 
and then amazingly guided this largest developing economy to achieve an 
unprecedented growth record. According to Confucian wisdom, the age of 30 
symbolizes the crucial point when a person establishes a career path. Therefore, at this 
historic moment, people are naturally eager to know about China’s blueprint for the 
future, and more importantly, its feasibility. 
The construction of an innovative country is no doubt a fundamental aspect of 
this blueprint. China has long been criticized for being trapped in its comparative 
advantage, by simply making profit in the final stages of production 
(assembling/processing) that are labor intensive, while the upstream, capital-intensive 
stages of production (critical semi-finished products and components) are imported or 
imitated. Observers believe that the lack of technological preeminence would soon 
constrain China’s next phase toward moderate prosperity—the achievement of a per 
capita income level of $10,000, where innovation capability is more important to 
sustain the momentum of growth. In response, the Chinese government has 
significantly increased its investment in the science and technology (S&T) domain 
ever since the mid 1990s and urged domestic enterprises to enlarge their research and 
development (R&D) outlays to enhance their innovation capability. It even 
promulgated a “National Guidelines on a Medium- and Long-term Program for 
Science and Technology Development 2006-2020” (hereafter S&T Guideline) to 
substantiate the central government’s determination of reshaping China into an 
innovative country through its “Independent Innovation Strategy” (IIS) 2 (Zizhu 
Chuangxin Zhanlue) 
Surprisingly, there is very little international literature to assess the foregoing 
policies. This paper is a first attempt to summarize the relevant literatures and to 
briefly analyze their contributions and deficiencies. To overcome those deficiencies, 
we further outline a conceptual model to systematically reveal the negative influences 
of China’s state monopoly on its market structure and innovation performance, 
indicating a poor prospect for IIS. Beyond that, by re-examining the data sets 
employed in previous studies and supplementing them with new empirical material 
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available, this research will identify the problems that have led to an overoptimistic 
estimation of China’s S&T takeoff process and will uncover solid evidence that 
strengthens its theoretical prediction.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2, on “Debates”, 
presents a review of the controversies that have arisen around China’s government 
mandated technology catch-up attempt. Section 3, on the “Anatomy of the catch-up 
attempt”, reinterprets the previous debate in terms of a market structure analysis, 
where we unveil the inertia among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) toward innovation, 
and their hostility to horizontal and vertical innovation flows. In Section 4, on 
“Empirical evidence”, together with a discussion of relevant data sets, we revise the 
expectations of the outcome of China’s pledge to become a leading innovative nation. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Debates 
2.1 Prefatory Remarks 
Historically, the Chinese people launched two remarkable attempts to catch up 
with the global technology frontier after the Opium War in 1840, both of which lasted 
three decades, or so and ended up as miserable failures. First, during the 30-year 
period 1865-1894, the Qing dynasty conducted the “Foreign Affair Movement” 
(Yangwu yundong) which widely established publicly financed schools and arsenals 
that aimed to modernize the late imperial China. However, an unexpected defeat in 
the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) terminated this attempt, only leaving behind 
blame for its failure due to its over-reliance on an irredeemably corrupt and inefficient 
government (Elman, 2003).  
The government did change after the Communist Party of China (CPC) took over 
the country in 1949, ceasing its constant state of war throughout the first half of the 
20th century, and started to pursue a heavy-industry-oriented development strategy. 
The new central government expected that the Soviet model could rapidly lead the 
country to regain its economic and technology power, but, ironically, after the Great 
Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976, economic 
development stagnated and the technology gap between China and the advanced 
countries clearly increased as a result of the advent of another worldwide technical 
revolution at the same time. This irrational command economy pursued over 27 years 
(1952-1978) ultimately resulted in the outcome that China became one of the poorest 
countries in the world by 1978, with a per capita GDP of $148, lower than 
contemporary Pakistan’s $260, India’s $248, let alone the developed countries’ 
average of $10,000 (OECD, 2002). 
In the last three decades, in contrast, China has achieved stunning economic 
growth in its third attempt to catch up—the Reform and Opening Up, where “Reform” 
mainly stands for moving away from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy and “Opening Up” represents the transformation from a closed or 
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semi-closed nation to a fully opened one (S. Hu, 2008). Between 1978 and 2006, 
China maintained an annual nominal GDP growth rate of 9.7 percent, enlarging its 
economic magnitude for more than 13 times. In 2007, the overall size of the economy 
ranked fourth in the world, and the volumes of import and export, $2.17 trillion, made 
China the third-largest trading nation. In particular, the persistent execution of a 
national technology-enhancing strategy during the last two decades: namely, “trading 
market share for technology”3(Cheng, 2008; Liu, 2002; Ran et al, 2007), has appeared 
to significantly improve China’s industrial technology level: an examination of 
China’s export composition shows a large shift from primary products to 
manufactured goods since the 1980s, and an increased share of relatively capital- and 
technology- intensive products – mainly machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 
after the mid-1990s (OECD, 2002). Given this sustained momentum, nearly 150 years 
after the “Foreign Affair Movement”, the Chinese people’s perseverance in the pursuit 
of advanced technology finally seems to have paid off.  
However, at this point the China’s Miracle becomes ambiguous, and a 
controversial story thus unfolds. 
2.2  “Phantom menace” versus “S&T takeoff” in China 
Gilboy’s criticism (2004) of the fictitious explosion of China’s technology and 
innovation capability is probably the most representative among similar studies 
(OECD, 2002; Parker, 1995), because of its uniquely structural and institutional 
analysis of China’s industrial restructuring process, combined with pertinent cases, 
observations and informative data. By stressing that foreign firms are still claiming 
the lion’s share of China’s industrial exports, while its domestic technology leader 
--the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)-- is severely addicted to imported technologies, 
Gilboy depicted the current Chinese industrial structure as being composed of 
inefficient yet powerful SOEs, increasingly dominant foreign firms, and a private 
sector that is unable to compete with others on equal terms. In this regard, it is 
unwarranted to take China’s sudden rise in global trade, particularly in the export of 
technology and industrial goods, as a realistic threat to the preeminence of 
industrialized countries. In addition, from an institutional perspective, Gilboy has 
generalized China’s “industrial strategic culture”, which is distorted by its unreformed 
political system, as an encouragement to seek short-term profit, local autonomy, and 
excessive diversification. This “culture” tends to chronically jeopardize networking 
efforts among firms, industries and research institutes, to deny investment in 
long-term technology development and diffusion, and to indulge inefficiency and 
technological dependency with local protectionism and particularism, which acting 
altogether will continue to suppress the formation of a productive national innovation 
system (NIS).  
                                                        
3
 The set of policies that introduce Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) to transfer their advanced technology to 
China, e.g. transferring their latest product or latest technology to MNCs’ joint-ventures in China, setting up 
Research and Development (R&D) centers in China. As a reward, MNCs are accordingly issued with their market 
entry permissions. 
4 
 
Just like a fuse, Gilboy’s paper and its overlooked predecessors soon ignited a 
nation wide explosion of, hitherto inhibited, reflections on the foregoing 
technology-enhancing strategy in China (Gao et al, 2007; Lu, 2006). As a response to 
the outpouring of criticism on the technology innovation performance of domestic 
industries, on the one hand, the Chinese government tried to advertise Huwei, Haier 
and Bao Steel, some exceptional domestic enterprises which appeared to be innovative, 
as examples to counteract the fury; and, on the other hand, surprisingly promptly, the 
State Council issued the S&T Guideline in February 2006. Along with more 
innovation assessment indicators such as patents and the amount of international 
academic publications, the Chinese government mandated that, in 15 years, China’s 
R&D expenditure in GDP will reach 2.5 percent; science and technology progress will 
contribute at least 60 percent to the country’s development; and, meanwhile, the 
country’s reliance on foreign technology will decline to 30 percent and below (Zhu, 
2006). Shortly afterwards, this guideline evolved into a new alternative 
technology-enhancing strategy: namely, the IIS, which was first referred to in China’s 
“11th Five-Year Plan”, announced in October 2006 (Pan, 2006), and then reaffirmed 
by the CPC’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” promulgated one year later (J. Hu, 
2007). These grass-rooted agreements to Gilboy’s criticism together with a series of 
immediate top-down policy reactions reflected the social consensus that, despite a 
nearly double digit GDP growth rate, China’s international status in terms of 
innovation capability had barely improved. 
On the contrary, Jefferson (2005) argued that Gilboy’s estimation of China’s 
inferiority in innovation capability was based on biased observations. For instance, 
over stressing the difference in performance between Chinese enterprises and 
foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs)4 in high-tech products exports tends to ignore the 
more subtle story of China’s technological transformation, where more labor-using 
and capital- and energy-saving innovations have been produced. Further, Gilboy’s 
data also underestimated the Chinese enterprises’ R&D efforts5. Apart from these 
criticisms, Jefferson opposed Gilboy’s assertion that China’s rise in technological 
innovation was just a “phantom menace” with reference to two additional sources: 
first, the national R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP) of China had rapidly climbed to 1.3 percent in 2003, substantially greater than 
what would be expected given the country’s level of per capita income; second, the 
preceding surge in China’s R&D intensity had resulted from the boom in 
enterprise-financed R&D instead of government funding, indicating a more 
market-oriented and commercialized innovation structure. Accordingly, his conclusion 
is rather that R&D has become extensively and deeply embedded in China’s 
enterprise system, and has thus enabled the country to experience S&T takeoff. 
The appearance of another OECD report centered on international comparisons 
based on a set of science, technology and innovation indicators (OECD, 2006), also 
echoes Jefferson’s opinion. By admitting that, between 1995 and 2004, China’s R&D 
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spending has quintupled in real terms and ranks right behind the U.S., the EU and 
Japan, the report named China as one of “the most dynamic elements of the global 
innovation network”(p. 16). What is more, the report provides more statistics to 
strengthen the potential of China in innovation, e.g. the number of researchers in the 
country also increased by 77 percent between 1995 and 2004, ranking second 
worldwide in terms of human resource input to R&D. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
government’s S&T Guideline was especially highlighted and welcomed as a 
promising means of ensuring both a degree of continuity in government policy and 
relevance to a changing innovation environment. 
2.3 A Critical Review of the Controversy 
Gilboy (2004) insisted that developing technology is a difficult and uncertain 
process, where neither large capital investment nor a significant stock of existing 
science and engineering capability can guarantee success. Therefore, the investment 
issue only matters when assuming “ceteris paribus”. Otherwise, investment could be 
misplaced to disguise more significant deficiencies in a certain innovation system, or 
to crowd out those more effective solutions but undesirable to the authorities.  
This argument appears to be a fatal yet overlooked attack on his opponents: in 
Jefferson’s (2005) paper, S&T takeoff was defined as “an abrupt increase in a 
country’s ratio of research and development spending to GDP from less than one 
percent to more than two percent” (p.44). And this definition can be traced back to the 
situation that the seven largest and richest economies in the world all experienced 
such a remarkable acceleration of R&D intensity on average within the span of a 
single decade. By measuring China’s outstanding R&D intensity growth from 
1996-2003 against this criteria, especially combined with another discovery that 
enterprise-financed R&D accounted for the major part of the increase above, Jefferson 
saw China in the middle of its S&T takeoff. Unfortunately, huge varieties in 
differences and gaps still exist between China and the OECD countries6in terms of per 
capita income and educational level, industrial structure, institutions, history and 
culture, which simply mean that the “ceteris paribus” condition no longer holds. 
Therefore, the attempt to assess a country’s creativity by a unidimensional investment 
criterion is apparently inappropriate. In addition, even within OECD countries, 
economic history studies have suggested that, rather than R&D intensity growth, the 
establishment of a social payoff structure favoring innovation and entrepreneurial 
activities, i.e. the rule of law, the protection of personal property and intellectual 
property and the antitrust legislation, was the main contribution to their leading 
position in technology progress (Baumol, 1990, 1993; Landes, 2006; Olson, 1982). 
Neither was there significant causality identified between R&D investment and 
innovation capacity among comparable countries (OECD, 2007). As a consequence, 
policy recommendations that partially emphasize the efficacy of R&D intensity 
growth as an indicator of technological success, particularly those for developing 
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countries like China, are weakly grounded. 
Gilboy regarded China’s unreformed political system as its Achilles’ heel for 
proposed catch-up efforts. This handicap had two aspects: first, a government- 
mandated monopoly for SOEs in selected industries has continually spoiled these 
enterprises. CEOs in SOEs without the pressure of market competition thus prefer to 
forgo independent innovation which contains more risks in terms of the fulfillment of 
their imposed profit and tax turnover objectives. Second, the CPC’s control over all 
aspects of organized life leaves few opportunities for firms to work together for their 
legitimate common interests. This structure drives business leaders to focus on 
building relationships through CPC officials and on vertical, bureaucratic 
relationships instead of independent social organization and horizontal networking, 
which is extremely hostile to innovation because of its potential destructive effect on 
vested interests. Therefore, without structural political reforms, China’s ability to 
indigenize, develop, and diffuse technology will remain limited. 
Suspicions of Gilboy’s conclusion, however, come along with China’s reform 
progress in associated fields after 2003, the year after which all Gilboy’s empirics had 
been sourced. First of all, a new government organ: namely, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), was founded in April 2003 to 
cut direct interference from the government to SOEs. Later, in October of the same 
year, the central government further called for “mixed ownership” of SOEs, allowing 
more private investment—and presumably a more entrepreneurial spirit—in them7 
(Fewsmith, 2004). Meanwhile, obliged by SASAC, the central SOEs’ R&D 
investment as a percentage of their sales revenue increased to 36 percent annually 
after 2003, and their senior managers’ performance was required to be assessed 
additionally with a new index of “science and technology investment” after 2006. 
Hence, two questions arise: will the reform of SOEs’ corporate governance system 
end their apathy in innovation? And can SASAC successfully wield its power over 
SOEs to conduct efficient R&D?   
In brief, our preceding review discovers that the analysis in the current literatures 
on China’s catch-up efforts in the technology and innovation sphere either suffered 
from partiality due to dependence on contentious indicators or was lagging behind the 
most recent policy reforms that happened in the country. Apparently, more robust 
theory and associated conceptual and operational analysis are required to deepen and 
update this fascinating debate. 
3. Anatomy of the Catch-up Attempt 
3.1 Introduction to the Methodology 
The promulgation of IIS actually symbolized the advent of a climax in China’s 
latest technology catch-up attempt, where implicit, temporary and topical policy 
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efforts were finally subjected to state will with explicit, comprehensive strategies 
(Zheng and Chen, 2006). However, the Chinese government had also learned from 
previous failures and the experience of industrialized countries that such a state will 
needs to be carried out consensually by the industrial sectors. Accordingly, though IIS 
covers a bunch of topics ranging from government procurement to education, and 
S&T management reform8, it especially identified enterprises as the key to build an 
innovative country. Therefore, an analysis of the feasibility of China’s technology 
catch-up attempt can be reasonably framed in the structure-conduct-performance 
methodology of industrial economics, instead of being related to every field indicated 
in IIS.  
According to this view, in brief, market structure determines the behavior of the 
firms in the market, and the behavior of firms determines the various aspects of 
market performance (Martin, 1994). Three focal issues of the previous debate, 
government intervention, R&D investment, and innovative capacity, enter into each of 
the three aforementioned methodological categories, respectively: the economist’s 
model of perfect competition assumes that a market structure consists of many small 
buyers and sellers, dealing in a standardized product, under conditions of free and 
easy entry and complete and perfect knowledge, while the government intervention’s 
intentions and results are always leading to volatility in market structure, i.e. changes 
in the number and size distribution of sellers or buyers, product differentiation and 
market entry conditions; R&D investments and associated activities, assumed to be 
conducted by firm(s) in a market economy, reflect attempts and efforts to destroy a 
perfectly competitive market, while seeking technology and product preeminence 
(monopoly), just like other similar behavior such as collusion in terms of purpose; 
innovation capacity typically represents the situation of the firm(s) in progressiveness 
or dynamic efficiency, and directly determines its (their) other performance indicators 
such as profitability and efficiency, and thus falls into the performance category. 
3.2 A Conceptual Exploratory Model for Innovation 
Baumol’s work (Baumol, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) ranks among the most well-known 
applications of the preceding analytical framework, albeit in an implicit sense, in its 
attempting to answer one of the most perplexing issues of our time—whence 
innovation? During his exploration of the modeling of the unprecedented growth and 
innovation performance of the free-market economies, Baumol suggested that what 
was missing in all other economies is the pressure to innovate, including active 
dissemination and promotion of usage. In other words, although markets of substantial 
importance exist in virtually every economy of the world and have existed throughout 
recorded history, an innovation-nourishing market structure, characterized by the 
prevention of arbitrary government interventions and vigorous oligopolistic 
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competition, only began to emerge and develop in free-market economies9 within the 
last two hundred years or so. 
Our conceptual model hence stems from the aggregation of Baumol’s 
interpretation with the research methodology we proposed in section 3.1 (see Figure 
1). In a certain industry, the bulk of private R&D spending is shown to be conducted 
by a very small number of very large firms, which are forced to internalize innovative 
activities rather than leave them to fortuitous discoveries and thus turn them into a 
routinized, assembly-line process; small entrepreneurial entrants (independent 
innovators) continue to predominate in revolutionary breakthroughs with large 
oligopolists providing streams of incremental improvements that add up to major 
contributions; moreover, enabled by the intellectual property mechanism, these firms 
voluntarily disseminate much of their innovative technology widely and rapidly, both 
as a major revenue source and in exchange for the complementary technological 
property of other firms, including direct competitors, which helps to internalize the 
externalities of innovation and speeds up the elimination of obsolete technology. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
In general, this model maintains that, as long as there is no administratively 
created entry barriers, as long as misguided anti-trust bureaucrats avoid frustrating the 
legislation, and, as long as the incentives in the system do not distort the allocation of 
resources from creative innovation to parasitical rent-seekers, the three market 
structure features referred to above can do – and actually have already done – a far 
better job at generating technological progress than any other economic regime10. 
Before we come to the anatomy of China’s technology catch-up attempt, in 
particular, the latest IIS, on the basis of the preceding model there are several 
observations to be made that deserve more attention: 
I. The critical and growing role of routine innovative activity does not mean that 
independent innovation no longer plays a significant role. On the contrary, “The most 
revolutionary new ideas have been, and are likely to continue to be, provided 
preponderantly by independent innovators” (Baumol, 2002b). Therefore, the threshold 
of market entry may be increased by sunk costs, rather than by administrative 
monopoly or oligopolistic collusion, which artificially discourages independent 
innovation. 
II. Only by imposing the constraint of competition can people establish the 
correlation between R&D outlays and innovation, or between oligopolists and 
routinized innovation. In this way, the existence of a payoff structure and a level 
playing field favoring “productive entrepreneurship” (Baumol, 1990, 1993) become 
irreplaceable identification mechanisms for efficient R&D and fruitful oligopoly. 
III. Technology licensing from independent innovators to oligopolists and among 
oligopolists is partly made possible by assuming that the oligopolists prefer staying on 
the technology frontier rather than importing matured technology as a follower. Yet 
this is seldom the case, while technology leaders are not allowed to threaten the profit 
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of their followers. 
3.3 Inferences and Hypotheses of Our Study 
China’s market structure for innovation production can no longer regress to a 
command-economy pattern as a result of the painful lessons learned from the failure 
of its second catch-up(1952-1978). Apparently, there is only one desirable model 
currently available to pursue—the free market economy, which if approached properly, 
has lately been proved to be feasible as evidenced by the successful experiences of 
Japan, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore and S. Korea. After the mid-1990s, China’s 
assertion to be a market economy and its final accession into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) additionally reflected its determination to release and upgrade 
the country’s comparative advantage by embracing competition between market 
economies. This in general explains why we choose the Baumol model to infer the 
outcome of China’s innovation strategy as a criterion.  
But we should not forget that this market economy was defined as a “Socialist 
Market Economy” (SME). In other words, the CPC’s political oligarchy should not be 
put danger on the journey to a market economy. Therefore, the state economy must 
maintain predominance in the “strategic” and “pillar” industries (J. Hu, 2007). Further, 
it must generate sufficient tax revenues to ensure the central government’s authority 
over other vested interests and local government, whose exploding socioeconomic 
power tends to result in regionalism and subvert the political and economic order 
(Parker, 1995; Young, 2000). 
As a consequence, the market structure in China is imposed with a political and 
ideological requirement concerning the performance of SOEs. Government 
interventions thus can never be avoided as long as the level playing field allows 
wash-out. Most studies so far have been wrestling with this dilemma, and tend to 
condemn China’s political system, which is apparently problematic yet is unlikely to 
change in the near future. 
Logically, there are two ways out of this dilemma, assuming the maintenance of 
the CPC’s political position: first, by making the SOEs competitive with the non-state 
sector in all potentially contestable markets, which means that the SOEs, as a winner 
of fair play, will not be washed out; second, by allowing SOEs to be protected in 
selected industries by administrative monopoly/ oligopoly, meaning that SOEs are 
mandated to be the winner. The first way seems to be a perfect solution, yet too 
perfect to be carried out from the perspective of modern firm theory (Bai and Xu, 
2005; Parker, 1995) and with no successful precedent to follow; the latter, conversely, 
falls back into the vicious circle of SOEs in a centrally planned economy and is 
doomed to fail in a long run. Therefore, in practice, only one option is left for the 
Chinese government—challenging extant theories such as “principal-agent” and “soft 
budget constraint” with an innovative reform of SOEs’ corporate governance, 
transforming them into competitive oligopolists which can survive without 
administrative protection. 
But is it possible to cultivate technological competitiveness in a noncompetitive 
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environment? 
Discouraged routinized innovation. In October 2006, almost coincident with the 
promotion of IIS in China’s “11th Five Year Plan”, SASAC declared outright that 
seven sectors (Table 1), on account of their strategic importance related to national or 
economic security, would maintain their government controlled status, through either 
sole ownership or an absolute controlling stake. Furthermore, the state will also stick 
to its absolute or relative controlling stakes in other industries, described as pillar and 
basic industries (SASAC, 2006). While defining strategic sectors is a fairly common 
practice among other governments, imposing restrictions on the “basic and pillar 
industries”, which includes the auto, construction and IT sectors where government 
ownership normally plays a minor role, definitely exceeds the current practice in 
industrialized economies. As we have stressed in observation II, competition is the 
first prerequisite and an irreplaceable impetus to enable the operation of the “free 
market innovation machine”. The administrative monopoly or nominal oligopoly in 
China, however, fundamentally removes the incentive for innovation—as long as the 
market entry of competitors such as domestic private enterprises or MNCs is 
prohibited, the life-and-death matter for SOE managers to fulfill their imposed 
multitasks will still be the continuity and stability of production within their 
prefectures (Bai and Xu, 2005). In that case, the opportunity costs of risky R&D 
outlays on innovation appear to be unfavorable compared with the investment in 
importing matured technology bundles, especially when there is no need for SOEs to 
worry that their foreign licensors may use their technology dependence against them 
someday. Meanwhile, enormous R&D outlays on rountinized innovation also compete 
with the SOE managers’ budget for lobbying key officials from SASAC or even 
higher levels in order to obtain and extend their “exceptional” treatment: monopoly 
position, special access to resources, exemption from environmental protection or 
energy-saving rules and regulations, which will reduce the risk of “particularism”, the 
biggest risk for monopolists and oligopolists in China’s state-protected sectors. In this 
regard, the technology risk of being a parasite on imported equipment is relatively 
minor. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
As a matter of fact, the central government in China is certainly aware of the 
drawbacks of the SOEs’ monopoly in terms of their inherent inertia to innovation. In 
response, SASAC mandated a hardened R&D investment index to complement 
traditional fiscal standards for assessing the overall performance of SOE managers11. 
Accordingly, the central SOEs’ R&D investment reached a level of $9.6 billion in 
2004, a 76 percent and a 218 percent increase on the figures for 2003 and 2002, 
respectively; and triadic patents (issued by the US, the EU and Japan) and domestic 
patents issued to central SOEs have increased at an average annual rate of 28 percent 
since 2004. In 2005, the ratio of central SOEs’ R&D investment to their sales climbed 
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up to 1.5 percent, and the industrial SOEs’ percentage was 2 percent (SASAC, 2006). 
Hence, the Chinese government was convinced that monopolists or oligopolists in 
China could also be able to play a leading role in empowering innovation production. 
For instance, among 14 key research projects designated by the nation’s 11th Five Year 
Plan, 12 are allocated to the central SOEs. 
However, this government-mandated R&D investment wave is problematic for, at 
least two reasons: first, as warned in observation II, R&D outlays tend to suffer from 
low efficiency and usually result in waste when they are isolated from the 
identification mechanism composed of competition and entrepreneurial 
commercialization. The setup and enlargement of R&D departments in SOEs, 
together with the proposal of research projects, are designed to make them become 
specialists in overoptimistic grant applications, or, even worse, deliberate frauds to bid 
for government grants (Barboza, 2006). Without the test of competition, research 
resources among SOEs and public research institutes are seriously segmented or 
repetitive. It has recently become known that merely less than 10 percent of China’s 
medium- and large-size firms’ R&D achievements could be applied at the industrial 
level (Zheng and Chen, 2007), revealing the astonishing inefficiency of their R&D 
investment. 
Second, while increased R&D investments of poor efficacy can not justify their 
outlay by making profit, they become heavy burdens on SOEs. SASAC announced in 
2006 that, within 5 years, the ratio of central SOEs’ R&D investment to their sales has 
to reach 3.5 percent from 2 percent while technological reserves should increase to 15 
years at least. This is not a rigorous requirement12, but it is a difficult one under the 
current situation where most SOEs have to import technologies for their present needs. 
Moreover, the spending by China’s industrial enterprises on technology indigenization 
is only 6 percent of that of technology import, while this ratio in S. Korea and Japan 
reaches 500 percent to 800 percent. However, SASAC outrageously regulated that 
independently developed new products should account for at least 30 percent of the 
central SOEs’ total products by the end of 2011. Such a radical transformation would 
be almost a “big bang” or another “Great Leap Forward”, given the SOEs’ current 
technology development model. But what if these ambitious objectives established by 
unprofessional government officials are far beyond the real capability of SOEs? Rents 
will be generated in supervising and inspecting organizations such as SASAC, while 
SOE managers will have to manipulate statistics and achievements. Finally, new 
policies will induce new rent-seeking opportunities. 
Hindered Independent Innovation. The independent innovations in Baumol’s 
theory: namely, those scattered innovations conducted by small entrepreneurial 
enterprises, ironically face a dead-end during the implementation of IIS in those 
monopolistic industries. First, recalling observation I, while the Chinese government 
can not afford “creative destruction” where private entrants may replace state-owned 
incumbents with revolutionary technology breakthroughs, any persons of 
entrepreneurial genius will be immediately paralyzed by the thought that their efforts 
                                                        
12The R&D-sales ratio is still relatively low compared with the normal industrialized countries’ ratio of 5 percent. 
Furthermore, most giant MNCs have a 30-year to 50-year technological reserve (Zheng and Chen, 2007). 
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will only win them punishment or confiscation rather than rewards. More tragically, 7 
out of 11 priority areas identified by the S&T Guideline appear to overlap with those 
key industries or pillar industries defined by the SASAC (see the Appendix), 
suggesting that, in those intersections, there will be no promising futures for 
independent innovators. Therefore, after one step forward in IIS, state monopoly 
again has the effect of driving talent away. 
Dissemination Without Outlets. Depending on prices, sunk costs and opportunity 
costs, it is often most profitable for the monopoly owner of an innovation to specialize 
in the business of renting the input to others, rather than using it itself as an input to 
its own final product. Sometimes, the highest profits are obtained by the owner of the 
rights to an innovation, if it simultaneously uses the invention as an input in its own 
production and rents its use to others. Unfortunately, as shown by observation III, 
when monopolists or administratively segmented oligopolists are discouraged from 
participating in innovation and are reconciled to more matured, imported technology 
bundles which hardly require the effort of indigenization, the outlets for technology 
dissemination also shrink: independent innovators who prefer to become specialized 
licensors have to abandon their ideas, since there is less demand from the incumbents 
to commercialize their products and to put them into large scale production because of 
their limited indigenization capability bred by technology dependence. Meanwhile, 
Chinese monopolists generally avoid technology collaboration or trading within their 
industry, especially if such a collaboration or trading crosses regional or bureaucratic 
boundaries, simply because these practices would generate too much transaction costs 
and political risk during the entanglements with other SOEs and their patrons from 
associated government ministries. Although the establishment of SASAC is assumed 
to overcome such deficiencies of departmentalization, several recent cases have 
proved that even SASAC itself can not be exempted from the tyranny of powerful 
patrons behind certain SOEs (Naughton, 2008). 
In sum, by applying our conceptual model in the Chinese industrial context, we 
conjecture that the prospects for IIS and its preceding technology catch-up attempt 
appears to be seriously obscured as a result of the counteractive effects caused by 
administrative monopoly or oligopoly. As shown in Figure 2, our specific hypotheses 
suggest that a market structure which prevents competition in a wide range of 
selective industries tends to breed, at the conduct level, an inherent R&D inertia 
among SOEs. Accordingly, it restrains entrepreneurial entrants and reduces the 
demand for technology dissemination. As a consequence, at the performance level, 
while the technology catch-up efforts measured by some input-oriented indicators 
may improve, the actual technology gap between SOEs and their comparable rivals 
will rather increase.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 R&D Inertia 
It is yet too early to directly deny the validity of IIS with any available data set, 
simply because the time span after the promulgation of the strategy, merely two years, 
is too short for the entire policy sets to unfold in this large country, let alone to take 
effect. However, in essence, IIS is merely an aggregated extension of the Chinese 
government’s consistent strategy of striving for the technology catch-up (Sutherland, 
2007; Yao, 2006; Zheng and Chen, 2006, 2007), i.e. by increasing overall R&D 
investment and obliging SOEs, especially the central SOEs, to play a vital role in 
building an innovative country while permitting them state monopoly or oligopoly. 
Such consistency, to some extent, allows us to test this paper’s preceding hypotheses 
preliminarily by carefully examining some associated historical empirics. 
Our first hypothesis at the conduct level in Figure 2: namely, the existence of 
R&D inertia in Chinese industries, contradicts some conventional empirics at first 
glance, as shown in Figure 3, where conventional indicators adopted to measure a 
country’s efforts in innovation (i.e. gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) and its 
intensity as a percentage of GDP) seem to echo Jefferson’s prediction in 2005 that 
China has been experiencing an S&T takeoff since the mid-1990s. In addition, Figures 
4 and 5 show an increasing and dominant share of industry-performed and -financed 
R&D outlays, which indicates favorably that the market is allocating most of the 
R&D resources, while enterprises have been more attracted to technology innovation.  
[Insert Figure 3- Figure 5 Here] 
However, Du et al. (2006) admitted that the NBS’s adjustment of the statistical 
scope regarding R&D resources since 2000 had significantly increased the 
contribution of the industry sector. Sourcing back to Shi (2004), we noticed that NBS 
after 1999 started to incorporate R&D expenditure from small high-tech firms located 
in national level high-tech development zones (HTDZs). This was further extended in 
2000 to include small high-tech firms outside HTDZs, FFE sponsored independent 
research institutes, and firms specialized in software development, geological 
exploration, water conservancy, and general technology services. Shi also estimated 
that previous adjustments had resulted in an R&D expenditure rise that amounted to 
12.6 billion RMB, 0.14 percent of China’s nominal GDP in 2000. With this reference, 
we have executed a recalculation showing that this “bonus” part accounts for 25.60 
percent of the contemporary R&D expenditures financed by the industry sector in 
2000. Therefore, a 41.12 percent share in GERD financed by the industry sector was 
increased to 55.24 percent under the new statistical scope, which means that 
compared with the 34.94 percent share in 1999, nearly 70 percent of the increased 
portion can be explained by the application of the new statistical definition. Likewise, 
similar effects undoubtedly exist with respect to both the GERD performers’ statistics 
and the GERD statistics. 
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Therefore, our further investigations on the data sources suggest that the conflicts 
between hypothesized R&D inertia and the empirical data are magnified primarily as 
a result of the adjustments that took place in China’s official statistical orientation. In 
other words, the Chinese government’s policy effects after the mid-1990s, in terms of 
encouraging R&D investment, should first be deflated to a moderate degree, rather 
than be exaggerated into an S&T takeoff. 
More importantly, Table 2 reveals that the hypothesis of R&D inertia evidently 
prevailed at least between 2000 and 2004, where the FFEs’ R&D expenditure growth 
rate (27.60 percent) was 11.20 percent higher than that of the domestic enterprises 
(DEs); and the R&D intensity gap between FFEs and DEs expanded from 0.39 
percent to 1.01 percent. This tells us that, even without taking account of the 
efficiency issue, the R&D investment increase rate of DEs was comparatively falling 
behind that of their competitors in the domestic market, despite their loudly 
proclaimed tendency to grow in an absolute terms. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
As was further uncovered by Figure 6, the Chinese government’s decision to 
increase its S&T investment surprisingly resulted in a decreasing percentage of S&T 
expenditure in government revenue. If, however, the government really does prefer a 
technology catch-up, the S&T expenditure share in total government revenue is rather 
assumed to increase, although the government’s share in total S&T expenditure may 
decrease because of the rise in the industry sectors. This means that the R&D inertia 
even prevails in the government sector, while the money promised for innovation is 
diverted to other places13(Wei, 2008). 
[Insert Figure 6 Here] 
4.2 Expanded Technology Gap  
General trade theory indicates that the upgrading of a nation’s comparative 
advantage and industrial structure can be best reflected by variations in its export 
composition, particularly in terms of the contribution from advanced industrial 
exports or high-tech industries (Gilboy, 2004; OECD, 2002). Jefferson (2005) once 
made the criticism that it was inappropriate to evaluate China’s improvement in 
innovation capacity largely according to its high-tech export sector. Since this sector 
accounted for barely 14 percent of the national merchandise exports in 2000, “the 
story of China’s technological transformation is far more subtle than the development 
and export of high-tech goods”. But, no matter how subtle the story is, the 
                                                        
13
 The latest statistics on China’s fiscal revenue announced by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in March 2008 
showed that the state’s fiscal revenue in 2007 hit 5.13 trillion RMB ($733 billion), an increase of 32.4 percent 
year-on-year. This is 20.7 percent of the nation’s GDP. After taking account of the additional income from 
government debt issuance (2 trillion RMB in 2007), extra-budgetary items and local governments’ administrative 
fees, the actual government revenue has soared to 11 trillion RMB, or 44 percent of the national GDP, which 
approximately equals the fiscal revenue ratio in 1978 (Xinhua,2008). Meanwhile, government expenditures in the 
public service area, such as social security, education and public health, repeat the pattern we discovered for R&D 
expenditure. Criticism has thus arisen implying that the Chinese government is devouring the country’s fortune 
(Wei, 2008).    
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improvement of China’s innovation competitiveness has to be tested on a level 
playing field — that of international trade competition, where an increasing share of 
high-tech products in total exports should be taken as the most direct indicator. 
Therefore, the performance of China’s domestic firms measured by this indicator 
undoubtedly reflects its own technological competitiveness in comparison with their 
FFE rivals. In addition, the proportion of high-tech goods in China’s exported 
merchandise more than doubled to 29 percent in 2006, which further limits the 
validity of Jefferson’s criticism. 
In Figure 7, we observed that the dominance of foreign firms in China’s high-tech 
products14 exports was unexpectedly reinforced, despite favorable reports simply 
using conventional, input-oriented indicators. The share of those high-tech exports 
produced by FFEs grew from 73.78 percent to 89.21 percent during the past decade or 
so, indicating that China’s soaring high-tech exports in the same period were 
attributed more to FFEs’ enlarged production capacity and enhanced technology level, 
rather than their domestic counterparts. What is more frustrating, a comparison of the 
market share of SOEs and FFEs in terms of high-tech products exports reveals that 
both the increased R&D expenditures of the SOEs and the government’s monopoly 
policies in selected high-tech industries (e.g. the aviation and aircrafts manufacturing 
industry, and the medical treatment instrument and meter industry) have failed to 
enable a SOE technology catch-up. This is consistent with our second hypothesis at 
the performance level in Figure 2 that, even though administrative command or 
mandated performance measurements may force DEs, particularly SOEs, to increase 
their R&D investment, the efficacy of such a marginal increase is often low, and 
ultimately results in an increased technology gap between SOEs and FFEs.  
[Insert Figure 7 Here] 
5. Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that China has to become innovative to sustain its growth, and the 
tactics to achieve this is nothing less than the encouragement of competition in a free 
market economy. However, this paper shows that the ambivalence about competition 
which stems from the government’s concern to maintain political oligarchy will 
hamper its parallel efforts aiming to build an innovative country. If such is the case, 
does that mean that policy instruments such as IIS are merely bravado, and that the 
prospects for China’s technology ascendance is only a “phantom”?  
This is not, however, entirely true. As we will see, “China is still a nation 
searching for a country”(Boisot and Child, 1996). In contrast to the Western 
democratic model, where a positive cohesion between government and society tends 
to exist, with the state merely being the codification of the nation through the rule of 
law, the Chinese model has yet to successfully codify a nation that has been 
accustomed to conduct transactions according to customary uncodified norms. 
                                                        
14The NBS defines the high-tech industries as Medical and Pharmaceutical Products, Aviation and Aircrafts 
Manufacturing, Electron and Communicate Equipments, Electronic Computers and Office Equipments, and 
Medical Treatment Instrument and Meter(NBS,2007b). 
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Establishing the notion of the criticality of innovation in such a huge and populous 
country, historically dominated by its preceding culture-history context, can not be 
realized in a short time. And neither can state patronage in industrial governance be 
ruled out in the near future. Hopefully, the promulgation of IIS will now at least 
enable the country to edge toward an incremental codification of the rules and 
institutions for innovation, albeit without the promise of an immediate takeoff. 
Two other factors may also support prudent optimism. Foremost, some of the 
market entry restrictive measures are to be phased out gradually as part of China’s 
WTO accession commitments. This will prevent the Chinese government from 
slowing down its SOEs’ reform and associated political reform if necessary, so as to 
ensure the competitiveness of the whole economy’s and thus guarantee its legitimacy. 
Second, in those competitive sectors that were to some extent exempted from severe 
government intervention, though less technology intensive, more vigorous 
innovations can be expected through persistent competition, comparative advantage 
upgrading, and the implementation of IIS. Their upcoming bottlenecks in terms of 
technology catch-up caused by the backwardness of those monopolized industries will 
become a domestic “push” to annul prolonged government protection.  
In sum, 30 years after its reform and open-door policy, China is still seeking 
access to an express road for technology catch-up. Ambitious plans, e.g. IIS, are 
continually undermined by deep-seated structural and institutional issues such as state 
monopoly. The exploration of the solution to this conundrum can be likened to the 
life-stages described by Confucius as moving from “I stood firm” to “I had no doubt”, 
except that China’s road toward independent innovation is likely to be a long struggle 
rather than the work of just another 10 years. 
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Table 1 SASAC’s regulation on SOEs’ position in various industries 
 
Source: Mattlin (2007). 
 
Table 2 Comparison of R&D expenditure and intensity by enterprise ownership (2000, 
2004) 
  2000 2004  
  R&D 
Expenditure 
(100 million 
RMB) 
Ratio 
(%) 
R&D 
Intensity 
(%) 
R&D 
Expenditure 
(100 million 
RMB) 
Ratio 
(%) 
R&D 
Intensity 
(%) 
Growth 
Rate: 
2000-2004 
(%) 
DEs  389.50 79.50 2.98 805.00 72.90 3.50 16.40 
FFEs  100.20 20.50 3.37 299.50 27.10 4.51 27.60 
 FFs 59.40 12.10 3.52 210.50 19.10 4.79 33.20 
 HMT 40.80 8.30 3.17 89.00 8.10 3.95 18.00 
Total  489.70 100.00 3.05 1104.5 100.00 3.73 18.90 
Source: China Science and Technology Statistics (STS) (2007). 
 
 
Official 
definition 
Specific industries Ownership requirements 
Central 
SOEs 
Strategic 
and key 
industries 
 
 
 
Defense, oil & petro- 
chemicals, power genera- 
tion, telecom, coal, civil 
aviation, shipping. 
Solely state-owned or absolute  
state control; increase state-owned 
asset accordingly.  
40 
Basic 
and pillar 
industries 
Equipment machinery, 
auto, IT, construction, 
steel, chemicals, land & 
mining exploration, base 
metals, R&D. 
 
 
 
Absolute or conditionally relative 
controlling stake; enhance the in- 
fluence of state ownership even  
though the ownership share is re- 
duced if appropriate. 
70 
Other 
industries 
Trading, investment, agric
ulture, pharmaceutical, 
construction materials, 
geological exploration. 
Maintaining necessary influence by 
controlling stakes in leading com-
panies; in non-key companies state 
ownership will be clearly reduced 
50 
21 
 
 
Figure 1 A conceptual model of industrial competition toward innovation 
Sources: Baumol (2002a; 2002b; 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Hypotheses of the conceptual model in the Chinese context 
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Figure 3 GERD and GERD intensity as a percentage of GDP in China, 1995-2007 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, NBS (2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2008). 
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Figure 4 GERD ratios of the Business and Government sectors, 1995-2006 
Sources: NBS (2007d) and OECD (2006). 
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Figure 5 GERD ratios financed by Industries and Government, 1995-2005 
Source: NBS (2007a). 
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Source: NBS (2007c). 
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Figure 7 FFEs’ share in national high-tech products export and a comparison of SOEs 
and FFEs in high-tech products export (selected years from 1995-2006) 
Source: NBS (2007b). 
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Appendix  
Highlights of China’s S&T Guideline 
A. Eleven Priority sectors: 
(1) Energy* 
(2) Water and mine resources* 
(3) Environment 
(4) Agriculture 
(5) Equipment Manufacture* 
(6) Transport* 
(7) Information industry and modern services industry* 
(8) Population and health care 
(9) Urbanization and urban development; 
(10) Public security* 
(11) National defense* 
* Denotes that this sector is regulated by SASAC to be predominated by SOEs. 
B. Eight Technology Areas: 
(1) Biotechnology 
(2) Information technology 
(3) New materials technology 
(4) Advanced manufacturing technology 
(5) Advanced energy technology 
(6) Oceanic technology 
(7) Laser technology 
(8) Space technology 
  
 
